ARCHIPELAGOS OF SECURITAZATION: a new logic of security and surveillance in latin american cities

Arquipélagos da Segurança : a nova lógica de segurança e vigilância nas cidades latino-americanas

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Abstract:

Currently, cities have profoundly gone through difficulties due to increases inequity, poverty, population growth and unemployment, in a certain way, which appears to generate the patterns of crime and violence. In democratic states, with high levels of development, above all the United States and Europe, crime and violence have been confronted through the use of surveillance devices and through their construction, conserving a highly bureaucratic capacity. However, in countries which are of medium or low economic, political, and social development, such as certain Latin American counties, the extension of surveillance technologies appears to take root in a different sense: given past dictatorial and one party governments, in Latin America political decisions refer more to patronage. In Latin American cities with social inequalities growing, it appears to draw a geography of fear where spaces are distributed between life and death, well-being and misery, security and suspicion, the rich and the poor. In this way, all along Latin America, there have been "fortress cities" constructed which resort to surveillance technologies and a certain "politics of verticality" to form archipelagoes of security. Without a doubt, this ordering of the region is related to a new "hemispherical logic of securitization", as a consequence of a series of United States initiatives and plans for Latin America. With the objective of analyzing the emersion of these archipelagos of securitization, the economic, political and social situation of certain large metropolises of the region. Keywords: surveillance, securitization, Latin American cities

INTRODUCTION

Since the 1990's, and as late as one decade after, the territorial and demographic growth in Latin American cities has exponentially increased, and along with it, the inequality and social fragmentation rates. People in charge of designing the governmental policies have alleged that this is the main cause of the unusual criminal growth in this region; being the most common those crimes related to mugging gangs, criminal organizations (e.g. illegal drug trade, money laundering, or kidnapping) and ever since 9/11, to terrorism. However, and in spite of this allegation, the current policies against crime have led to establish immediate responses more than generate structural policies to improve its causes. In this sense, since the 1990's, policies aiming at facing the insecurity located within certain groups with purposes of crime and delinquency, have focused on the improvement of sorting strategies and risk administration in Latin America, and so, the governmental security policies have been made active through strategies such as militarized police training, organization and equipping, army intervention in the main cities, police duty, reformation to the judicial, legislative and prison system as well as the formation of intelligence organisations, the use of "zero tolerance" policies, the regulation of non-governmental security organisations, the constitution of a national data base which includes economic, police force, social, demographic and political reports; so as to cartographically establish the delinquency and crime "red spots", as well as the expanded use of surveillance-assembled technologies with the created data base. (BOTELLO, 2006a; 2006b; ARRAIGADA; GODOY, 1999; WACQUANT, 2008; SMULOVITZ, 2005).

After 9/11, national security policies in Latin America started to assemble with the international policies regarding this matter (BIGO, 2006) to start regional and hemispheric securitization strategies within a transnational and cooperative system (LYON, 2007; BOTELLO, 2009). Bearing this in mind, policies to confront insecurity were defined by international organisations based on the concept of human security. According to the Declaration on Security in the Americas, the concept of security in the American region would lie in a multidimensional in-scope, that includes traditional and new threats, concerns and other challenges to the security of the countries (which comprise political, economical, social, health and environmental aspects –democracy, poverty, youth gang violence and natural disasters) (ORGANIZATION OF

AMERICAN STATES, 2003). In 2001, security policies in Latin America began to emerge in a hemispheric system which goes beyond the national context, nevertheless, the state decisions obey a mutual aid scheme; leading to a threat-based system of rules among countries: illegal drug dealing, human trafficking, money laundering, illegal immigration, and terrorism; all of which have been claimed to have an impact on the democratic organisations in the different countries in this region.

After the terrorist attack to the World Trade Center in New York, the governmental reactions towards insecurity have been based on border reinforcements, by means of extensive surveillance implementation and the use of classification technologies (the new ID- Cards, biometric devices or the foundation of an immigration data base); the use of national securitization strategies create a demographic data base comprising economic, political and social statistics, assembling with some others alike, in terms of region or hemisphere (like the Plan Colombia or the Merida Initiative) along with the surveillance and sorting in places likeable to be risky (socially-excluded areas, such as poor neighbourhoods, or wide regions of global economy -such as big financial or commercial spots) (LYON, 2007; BOTELLO, 2009). This way, in the past decade, security strategies in the Latin American area started to react to a certain logic urged by the United States government, which holds the "normal" development of things responsible for the rise of risk (BOTELLO, 2009).

And so, the security strategies applied in recent years respond to a governmental logic of micro-management of the population's fears (DELEUZE; GUATTARI, 1989), whose mechanisms lie in population control, exceptional nature, and surveillance policies. The current securitization paradigm in Latin America is expressed in the spatial planning, reflecting certain exclusion practices, alienation and social fragmentation. Likewise, this paradigm shows the use of various kinds of surveillance routines, which intend to maintain security; in other words, threat removal. The new security logic in Latin American cities and countries would be closely attached to a global logic of risk administration and forecast, located in specific areas inhabited by social groups defined as dangerous- just like those excluded from the economic and politic development process.

This is why the current observed status in several Latin American cities gives this paper its central argument; and it is worth mentioning that in those cities is where there exists a fragmentation process of the social area. This process is caused, up to a point, by the

mutation of the securitization discourse; according to which the main insecurity factor is found in social groups which would normally pursue the weakening of the democratic organizations. These groups are located in specific urban areas, classified according to very special characteristics: being poor, immigrant, excluded or unemployed. The new securitization paradigm in the cities in Latin America indicates the origin of insecurity, risk and the threat of breaking the balance of the social tissue, in which any individual represents a potential threat.

As a consequence, the new logic of security in Latin American cities resorts to exceptional strategies or to surveillance and social sorting strategies, and so, through the cessation of civil rights, civilian monitoring, as well as the prevention and administration of any risk, the governmental policies have no choice but to resort to the restriction of any event to fight against democracy weakening, no matter if it means the sheer expression of daily social relations.

To demonstrate this, the present paper is divided into four parts. The first one consists of an explanation of important terminology, where exceptionality, surveillance and social sorting are fundamental, followed by the characterization of the modern urban spaces where the architectonic and territorial fragmentation show somehow the integration of certain governmental practices and demographic and social space management, leading to what we will call "archipelagos of securitization". In the second part, the aim is to prove that these local strategies for urban security are the voice of the hemispheric and regional policies applied after 9/11. The third part deals with analyzing how the new security logic is produced in the urban sites of Latin America, adopting a new logic of securitization. Finally, in the fourth part, the resulting conclusions of this investigation are exposed.

EXCEPTIONALITY, SURVEILLANCE AND SOCIAL SORTING AS A NEW SECURITY PARADIGM

The basis of all discourses on security in most countries and all over the major cities in Latin America, is attached to the idea of maintaining delinquency and criminal violence under control; and ever since 9/11, the main concern is to fight terrorism threats. The implementation of strategies directed to deal with this, has favoured the construction of management spaces for fear (such as neighbourhoods, shopping malls, private and

public buildings, parks, business districts, streets or avenues), setting borderlines in zones referred to as "dangerous" (commonly *favelas*, *guettos* or socially excluded districts), where the application of local security policies plays a joint part along with international and regional referents, founding a set of procedures directed to reduce the odds of imminent danger. In this way, it seems that the different countries are working to consolidate policies and reformations to the judicial and police force systems, as well as border reinforcement among countries.

Likewise, it is now possible to notice securitization processes carried out in neighbourhoods and communities, which tend to establish and to perfect the security mechanisms. Economic inequality, poverty, and social exclusion are largely considered to be the main causes of crime and violence. And usually, the governmental policies consider these problems to be of great importance so as to be solved as soon as possible. This is why crime must be halted and immediately and quickly punished. Thereby, as Wacquant (2004) stated, security strategies appear to be a new form of government, applied to social insecurity, according to the complications of economic deregulation, a precarious working situation, social and urban exclusion. This Wacquant conception is, certainly, closely related to that conceived by Foucault (2004) in his last lectures, where he places security as a governmentality strategy: a security and surveillance device would be inserted in a control or referent of a series of probable events, in which the State intervenes in all cases where daily life is threatened by a unusual and singular event.

In his last lectures, Foucault (2004) defines governmentality as a set of organizations, discourse and administration techniques, discipline, security and sorting which tends to establish a fixed kind of government for a certain population. So, governmentality could be explained –in a liberal society context– as a set of dispositions and political, architectonic, economic, moral, judicial and bureaucratic technologies which allow the distribution of power. Taking this into consideration, we can say that power is distributed in the space, expressed in the territory, and it regulates the relationships of certain social groups or the population itself. Social power relationships would then regulate the territory. Just as Foucault places discipline as a main political source, in his latest studies he examines what he calls a security dispositif and its relation with the concept of governmentality: security grants the ability to make use of certain devices which only surveillance, control, and regulate the possibility of an existing risk. The

spatial concept of prison, ruled by the panopticon, turns out to be substituted by that of the city; the completeness of the territory instead of confinement, liberalism instead of discipline.

This kind of governmentality would describe spatial limits, determined by national or urban borders, controlled by surveillance and sorting technologies. If the analysis of governmentality could be somehow expanded, as in Agamben (2006) and Bigo (2006), power relationships would not imply the existence of panopticism, but an integration of exceptionality, surveillance and security. This reconstitution of governmentality dispositifs would result in a banoptic system (BIGO, 2006): the strategies facing insecurity and risk would constitute the suspension of rights (at an international level as in specific spaces, such as cities) monitoring and controlling the territory through global surveillance mechanisms. This way, the surveillance mechanisms would set rights cessation areas, where people are monitored and watched at all times and also regulated by public and private security organisms.

It is worth mentioning that as far as Agamben (2003) goes, exception is the mechanism that makes modern politics work. It stands out because it temporarily suspends law, and at the same time reaffirms it. It also draws a horizon which defines the outer and inner sides of law, enabling the location of power in a place –in the case of exceptionality-sovereignty. Exceptionality includes the arrangement of space through a moderated use of sorting, classification and demographic administration devices, as well as the differentiation between friends and enemies, citizens and foreigners, what is safe and what is not (AGAMBEN, 2006). For him, the ultimate current political paradigm is the concentration camps: where every law is suspended, to, paradoxically set a new order and establish certain laws (AGAMBEN, 2006). According to this, the camps that were run by *nazis* or the prisions built by anti-terrorists wouldn't be the only exceptionality spaces these days. Besides, they would include the locked-up communities and fortresses, highly monitored shopping malls, urban areas with private security agents and surveillance systems, the temporary border and airport detention areas as well as the excluded zones (DIKEN; BAGGE, 2005).

Bearing that in mind, this could be considered as an agreement between the governmentality and surveillance technologies; where the latter determine the former to a certain extent. This is mainly because the growth of the feeling of insecurity in modern societies has caused an expanded use of surveillance and monitoring

technologies in most countries –the use of CCTV, biometric tools (such as collecting genetic information from every inhabitant, fingerprinting or iris identification), the obligation to show identity cards or generate a population's data base. According to Lyon (2007), not only do surveillance technologies monitor social groups, but also they control, administrate, supervise and match individuals. This way, the global growth of crime, the same as terrorism fear (enhanced after 9/11) has speeded up the integration process of surveillance technologies, which tend to preserve security in very specific regions, even in those where, to set an example, a terrorist attack is not likely to happen, as in most Latin American countries.

Currently, as a politic response more than a law response, the surveillance technologies will endorse the creation of borderlines in the national territories and social areas, building strategies which would no longer be disciplinarian, but exceptionality and surveillance ones. This would have as an objective to prevent unforeseen events from happening or to provide information to face risk, making use of law cessation (as it happens in Latin American cities with the closure of streets or the monitoring of private spaces). As for this, the current policies applied to cope with insecurity and crime are in need of growth in the surveillance aspect, and along with it, the foundation of a specific kind of governmentality, based on the formation of exception spaces, due to the expanded usage of surveillance technologies.

From this point of view, the modern social areas, such as cities, would function as non-political spaces (where politics, conflicts and social risk are *nowhere to be found*). Contemporary urbanism would privilege the creation of welfare *ghettos*, isolated island-like localities, or "neutral cities": untouched spaces or mono-functional closed areas, where any exterior contact is reduced through fences, setting them apart from public life and danger (DIKEN; BAGGE, 2005; SENNETT, 1990). Nowadays, designing a city using a standard architecture, means planning proximity and social reclusion as well. And so, urban areas will be divided into welfare and security districts ("archipelagos of securitization") and exclusion and violence districts (referred to as "wild power areas" by Buck-Morss (2003). As a consequence, territorial borders will arise between them, reinforced by a social and economic categorization. It is true that both districts would function by means of locating exception, but it would produce two kinds of fielding: voluntary, where its entrance turns out to be closed but the exit is free; and that (which

could be referred to as involuntary) in which the exit is closed and the entrance is free (DIKEN; BAGGE, 2005).

It is certainly the determination of the national and urban territory, trough an exception system, which constitutes both spatial poles: that in which security, welfare and wealth are common to find, and that invaded by violence, fear and dread. In the former, social relationships live up to the speed of those globalized cities (with a precise urban planning, perfect means of communication, constant economic fluctuation), giving rise to mobility and interaction with other similar areas (meaning shopping malls, residential areas, business or working districts). In the latter, the territory consolidates disparity and an inevitable breakdown of social relations, easily recognisable due to certain sedimentation in mobility. In these power areas, security policies locate the conflict's starting point and risk, mainly composed by socially excluded groups. In both cases, surveillance and sorting of each event would grant the "normal" development not to be altered and here appears the micro-management of the population's fears.

It can be noted, somehow, how securitization policies have inserted these kinds of governmental mechanisms in Latin America within the last decade, where territorial fragmentation and demarcation have played a major role. Regarding this matter, the current spots where people move to, start to be thought of as spaces where there are more surveillance, control and sorting policies. This thought is greatly enhanced after the multiplication of different types of discourse in search of the prevention of any kind of event embedding danger, no matter how simple this might be. Parallel to this, not only have state borders emerged from this, but also territorial borders and those involving private space limits. Due to the implementation of monitoring technologies, which surveil, control, sort and administrate the population and also to certain governmentality which does not mix with social space, power has been located through the cessation of civil and social rights.

Consequently, it would not come as a surprise to witness a fusion between securitization strategies, made to reduce crime, and a securitization logic urged by the United States (where the Plan Colombia and the Merida Initiative are set as examples) where both exceptionality strategies pursue surveillance and risk sorting. Thereby, one can notice the expansion in usage of different security technologies in different areas and in diverse social contexts, shaping a sort of "archipelagos of securitization", which function as dikes aiming at maintaining certain social groups, considered to be

dangerous, under control –also overtly identified to be part of socially excluded sectors. In some way, the securitization archipelagos are exception pinpoints, where the cessation of civil or social rights (e.g. freely walking on the streets, or having access to public services) allows the determination of territorial borders. Moreover, with the foundation of these archipelagos, it is easier to define –in the context of demographic classification and monitoring– who is given permission to enter and who is not. As for the other pole, the wild power areas, the exception system enables the supervision of the entrance, but above all, it helps control who exits.

To provide the position of recent security strategies in Latin America with a context, an account of the social, economic and demographic conditions in the area will be presented below, emphasising the violent criminal phase this region has gone through in the past two decades.

VIOLENCE, CRIME, AND URBAN EXPLOSION: THE CONTEXT OF INSECURITY IN LATIN AMERICAN CITIES

In the last 20 years, criminality has either increased or considerably been modified in most countries in Latin America –showing variations related to each individual national context. To bring up some examples, it will be said that in Argentina in 1998 the rate of recorded crimes per 100, 000 inhabitants went up to 2, 556.64; in 1999, 2, 902.30; and in 2000, 3, 053.78. In Chile, the rate was, in 1998, 10, 171. 99; in 1999, 10, 766.61; and in 2000, 9, 275.91 recorded crimes per 100, 000 inhabitants. On the other hand, in Colombia, the rate of recorded crimes was, in 1998, of 549.63 per 100, 000 inhabitants, in 1999, 538.83, and in 2000, of 506.36. In the case of México, the rate in 1998 went up to 1, 433.81 per 100, 000 inhabitants, whilst in 1999 it was of 1,439.41, and in 2000, of 1, 391.54, in the case of Peru. We found, particularly that there are two countries in Central America which show a very meaningful crime rate after going through a civilian armed crisis: in Guatemala, during 1998, the rate of recorded crimes per 100, 000 inhabitants went up to 198.39, having shown an increase in 1999 and 2000, of about 200.48 to 249.63, respectively. El Salvador, presents a unique case, due to the fact that the grand total of prosecuted persons was only recorded along year 2000, raising its rate to 1, 173.50 per 100, 000 inhabitants (UNITED NATIONS OFFICE ON DRUGS AND CRIME, 1998; 2000).

The most common crimes, in terms of frequency, are theft, kidnapping and firearm murder. These crimes have been typically related to gangs located in urban sites, regularly constituted of immigrants, socially-excluded citizens or those living informally. And so, it has been estimated, for instance, that there are around of 70,000 and 200,000 gang members in Central America. An example for this would be the so-called *maras* (groups constituted by exiled immigrant youngsters, banned from the US to their origin countries; among which the vast majority are from Mexico, El Salvador and Guatemala; and who are convicts in their countries) (GENEVA DECLARATION SECRETARIAT, 2008).

In addition, gangs in Latin America appear in a context of patronage and political affiliation, social crisis or malaise, enhanced by macroeconomic distortions and political disorder, including formal and informal actors: soldiers, former police, paramilitaries, rebel groups and ex-combatants (GENEVA DECLARATION SECRETARIAT, 2008).

Generally, these groups are charged -but rarely prosecuted- with crimes such as delinquency, mugging, theft, harassment to rape, assault, and drug dealing. Additionally, after the reformation of policies against continental insecurity, these groups have been defined as "new urban insurgency". They are linked to insurrections and global terrorism, and referred to as the greatest problem for democracy and national security in México and Central America (GENEVA DECLARATION SECRETARIAT, 2008; RODGERS, 2007; BRUNEAU, 2005).

According to recent data, the second aspect to be taken into account is homicide rates, which is highly illustrative. As an example, in non-violent contexts in South America, we include, during 2004, around 95, 000 homicides. This rate indicates 19% in a global scale. During 2004, the homicide rate in South America and Central America goes from 20 and 30 per 100, 000 inhabitants; while in North America (Canada, the US and Mexico) goes from 5 and 10 per 100,000 inhabitants (GENEVA DECLARATION SECRETARIAT, 2008). Parallel to this, between 2004 and 2007, the direct mortality rate provoked by social conflicts in America rises to 82 homicides; in North America (including Canada, US, and México) the rate fluctuates to up to 283 homicides; while in South America the rate goes up to 11, 999 homicides. According to this data, within the same years, Colombia turns out to have the highest direct mortality rate: 11, 832 homicides (GENEVA DECLARATION SECRETARIAT, 2008).

Kidnapping is second nature in Latin America and its rates keep increasing and also varying its procedures. In 2007, Latin America reached its highest kidnapping level, rocketing to 684 incidences, which represent 74% worldwide, whereas between 1998 and 2002, the number increased to 4, 997 kidnappings (GENEVA DECLARATION SECRETARIAT, 2008). Regarding this matter, we could address three major Latin American countries. Firstly, Colombia, which recorded a total of 23, 854 kidnappings between 1996 and 2008. (FUNDACIÓN PAÍS LIBRE, 2008). During 2002, in Mexico, kidnapping represented 7% in a global scale, while express kidnapping represented 6%; in 2006, kidnapping plummeted to 1.7% (INSTITUTO CIUDADANO DE ESTUDIOS SOBRE INSEGURIDAD, 2002; 2006). Lastly, until 2003, Brazil had the lowest kidnapping levels: 1 per 100, 000 inhabitants. Sao Paulo proved to have the highest rate: .8 kidnappings per 100, 000 inhabitants. It is worth mentioning that the most common crime in Brazil is homicide. (NAÇÕES UNIDAS: ESCRITORIO SOBRE DROGAS E CRIME, 2003).

Taking the past numbers into consideration, the Gini index in Argentina rates 51.3; in Chile, 54.9; in México, 46.1; in Brazil, 57; in Colombia, 58.6, in Perú, 52; in El Salvador, 52.4; in Nicaragua, 43.1; while in Guatemala it rates 55.1 (WORLD BANK, 2007). In addition, in 2005, the urban demographic level in Argentina was 90.1%; in Chile, 87.6%; in México, 76%; in Brazil, 84.2%; in Colombia, 72.7%; in Perú, 72.6%; whilst El Salvador, Nicaragua and Guatemala resulted to have the lowest percentage: 59.8%, 59% and 47.2%, respectively (UNITED NATIONS, 2006).

Governmental response towards crime has focused mainly on prevention. Thereby, security strategies run by the governmental sphere in Latin America in the past two decades, have as central point, the reconstruction of the social and political space in the cities, turning them into controlled areas, where exceptionality, exclusion, classification and surveillance act as resources towards risk. The following part elaborates on the conformation of what we have called archipelagos of securitization, which are those governmentality areas implemented in modern Latin American cities, to expose the conditions under which security strategies in Latin America have been founded. Aiming at that objective, we will examine the response mechanisms towards crime, violence and insecurity in Latin American metropolis, bearing in mind that each country has a different background, but, somehow, respond to insecurity in the same way: be means of surveillance, securitization and social control strategies.

ARCHIPELAGOS OF SECURITIZATION: A NEW LOGIC OF SURVEILLANCE, SECURITY, AND SOCIAL CONTROL.

Since the 1990's, in the Latin America cities, a logic of fragmentation has been completed, constituting what we call 'archipelagos of securitization": territories with particular array of governmentality, establishing a sort of governmental strategies that tend to suspend certain civil rights –more technically that judicially–, pursuing to secure the law, creating spaces with a specific internal order, and building fortress borders sorting out the exterior (by means of private security and surveillance devices, as well as the exclusion of individuals classified as dangerous) (CALDEIRA, 1996; 2000). These archipelagos give evidence of a logic of segmentation of the political and social space; it also shows other kinds of order, like the regulation of the population movements, information and economic flux, and in the access to monitored places. In

this sense, the formation of archipelagos of security can be perceived in the design of Latin American cities; where, additionally to the edification of gated spaces separated from risk (represented by inhabitants of marginal *barrios* or *favelas*), proper communication routes are constructed to interconnect the security islands –those spaces would be, for example, where financial, commercial, educational, labor or amusement activities are performed–; places where the ultimate objective is to keep activities regular.

Since the 1970's and 1980's, the fragmentation of the Latin American urban space was characterized in terms of a distinction between rich areas versus 'forgotten' slum dwellers; dichotomy which expresses the constitution of urban poverty and social exclusion, suggesting a referent for territorial and social division of the metropolis in 'go' and 'no-go' zones (CALDEIRA, 2000; ROLNIK, 1999). Meanwhile, since the 1990's, the urban partition was identified with the 'unrule of law', i. e., the lack of security and the absence of law-enforcing authorities in the neglected –abandoned– parts of the urban territory (MÉNDEZ; O'DONNELL; PINHEIRO, 1999). In this period, the Latin American cities began to make use of an urbanity arrangement based on marginality, particularly to face insecurity and crime problems: the liaison between violence and poverty, and between economically-depressed zone citizens with delinquents, activating security strategies founded on frontiers directed to well-being and urban social exclusion (PERLMAN, 2005; PÉCAUT, 2004; RADCLIFFE, 2007).

In this sense, the relationship between urban poverty, insecurity and violence start in the characterization of the lack of economical, political, and social development. At this point, the determination of security involves the verification of a concept link between poverty, exclusion, state failure and violence; consolidated in some kind of human vulnerability. According to this, the definition of human security implies a concern in those risk factors, like poverty, marginality, or inequality. Citizenship insecurity, in this way, is reflected between those living in the different archipelagos of security. Additionally, a logic of social practices and perceptions, expressed in admission restrictions and restrictions to move and to act, implicate discrimination and stigmatization. Furthermore, this logic promotes victimization and provokes the lack of law application –public or private- towards citizens (KOONINGS; KRUIJT, 2007). Consequently, in Latin American cities, this geographical, economical, political, and social arrangement enables the organization of a particular treatment to violence,

insecurity, and crime; this organization, based in very specifics outlines, determine new strategies for social control.

To give an example of the transition in the setting of the security paradigm after a territorial and demographic growth in the 90's, but above all, after national economic and political turbulence, crime frequency in the metropolitan areas of Latin America raised to a significant extent. Kidnapping, theft and homicide increased, which led to the use of new policies against these crimes, whose main resource was not only public security, through punitive measures, but the implementation of risk-prevention mechanisms, guided by surveillance devices and social classification (ARTEAGA, 2006a; ARTEAGA, 2006b). This way, governmental policies against crime start to make use of surveillance mechanisms, social control, risk sorting and exceptionality, and not only to the legal model based on crime determination and punishment fulfillment.

In the mid nineties, along the highly populated urban areas of the region, local institutions started to apply new resources against violence and crime, based on surveillance and population management. These resources are directed to risk prevention, for instance, though the extended use of technologies such as CCTV, biometrics, electronic cards, GPS, as well as the creation of data base containing information related to salaries, health service access, age, criminal records and general expenditure. Other strategies are police posts in main streets and avenues (to detect possible criminals), aerial surveillance in specific shifts and sectors (with helicopters flown by military-trained police agents) or ground undercover surveillance. This unveils the formulation of risk control and sorting policies, established through the recognition of what is dangerous: vulnerable or socially excluded groups; using as main strategy, the instauration of law-exceptionality-based policies. In an overall view, this governmental management against crime, insecurity and delinquency in Latin American cities would be based upon surveillance devices which enable the retrieval of vital information for risk management. These devices would be attached to civil rights suspension, giving birth to banoptic systems.

Yet, private institutions have designed surveillance and security mechanisms. For instance, private security companies supply staff, equipment, logistics, and training for the surveillance of commercial, governmental, residential and learning spaces. In those economically, politically and socially-developed areas, private security companies

provide civilians with risk monitoring. In Latin America, it has been made easier to resort to private security, mainly because of a change in the State public security policies, which try to endorse nationally-important institutions (SMULOVITZ, 2005).

After 9/11, security policies in this region went further. By means of the embracement of Iniciativa Merida (hemispheric device for surveillance and social control between the US, México and several other countries in Central America), Plan Colombia, or the foundation of national security strategies based on surveillance and social classification (as the Plataforma México case), the Latin American governments begin to adopt interlinked policies to face insecurity, crime, migration, and, recently, terrorism; all of them defined, as a threat for regional democracy. Moving on to a political definition of risk, already adopted by international organisms –like the Organization of American States (OAS)– several countries in Latin America have established security strategies, so as to improve those implemented nationwide. This way, the control and surveillance of national frontiers to stop people and drug traffic, money laundering, and illegal migration, assemble with the policies already established in the countries. Mechanisms like sharing national data-base, allows the harmonization of control and social sorting, leading to the successful management of risk within the region.

All this is reflected in the regional urban spaces, where the possibility of hemispheric risks has been attached to insecurity, all of which end up affecting countries. So, in Latin America, war against drug trafficking or the management of illegal migration have lined up with the possibility of risk towards regional democracy, leading to the recognition to those devoted to illegal drug dealing, such as terrorists –after an increased violence wave in countries like México or Colombia (RIVERA; WILKEY, 2002; GUAQUETA, 2005; ARTEAGA, 2009). Along with this, illegal entrance through south US borders, has led to the use of surveillance and social sorting mechanisms. National security policies have changed their course and now they can be located in the cities, as they could be holding potential terrorist groups. However, surveillance and social sorting mechanisms have been naturally observed in Latin American cities, notwithstanding the fact that they have also been applied to all cities population, generating, apart from security new governmentality logic.

CONCLUSIONS

As we try to analyze, in the Latin American cities a fragmentation process of the social tissue is currently taking place, caused, in some sense, by the metamorphosis of the securitization discourse. With the incursion of a new paradigm of securitization, the main insecurity factor is found in some social groups (poor, unemployed, or immigrants). The new securitization policies in Latin America suggest the origin of insecurity, risk and the threat in the decomposition of the social tissue, in which any individual represents a potential threat. As a result, the new logic of security in Latin American cities adopts exceptionality strategies, assembling with surveillance and social sorting dispositifs. In this sense, we try to define these strategies as "archipelagos of securitization", conceived as dikes aiming at maintaining certain social groups, considered to be dangerous, under control. We try to prove as well, that some local strategies for urban security have been influenced by the hemispheric and regional policies spread after 9/11. This way, we analyze how the new security logic in urban sites of Latin America has adopted a new logic of securitization, based in surveillance and social sorting, fracturing, in some sense, the social tissue, primarily, territory and everyday life.

Therefore, adopting surveillance and social control mechanisms, the new paradigm of security shows a different way to characterize social relations; a characterization based on fear, suspicion, and exclusion. The importance of this context in the Latin American cities and countries is major. Thereby, the historical conditions in the region, are signaled by institutions based on patronage relations, police corruption, and law mistrust as well as in the institutions. This context reveals a great danger for the democratic institutions, as the information obtained from the population is not protected, not by the weakest of institutions. Another implication would be that this new logic of securitization denotes a transformation in everyday life, where the social actors are more driven by fear and suspicion among each other, creating spaces for protection and, at the same time, exclusion and marginality; eroding, perhaps, the place for politics.

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